Navy Chief Says Tomahawk Output Has SURGED

Aircraft carrier and support ships docked at a naval harbor
Photo: Rene Holtslag / Shutterstock

The United States has not tried to mass-produce a cruise missile at this scale in a generation, and the numbers now coming out of the Navy and its prime contractor amount to one of the sharpest industrial ramps in modern American weapons manufacturing.

Key Points

  • Acting Navy Secretary Hung Cao told senators Tomahawk output has gone from 125 missiles a year historically to more than 60 a month today — a roughly six-fold jump in annualized terms.
  • A seven-year, $22.9 billion Raytheon contract announced in August 2026 is designed to push sustained production above 1,000 Tomahawks annually.
  • The Navy’s FY2027 budget request seeks $3 billion for 785 Tomahawks as part of a planned 2,996-missile, five-year multiyear buy.
  • The production surge rests on an expanding supplier network — Raytheon, General Dynamics, L3Harris, and new Navy-run component manufacturing — some of which isn’t operational until mid-2027.
  • The ramp reflects a broader post-Ukraine shift in Pentagon thinking: treat munitions as an industrial-capacity problem, not just an inventory line.

What Cao Told the Senate

At his November 17, 2026 confirmation hearing, Hung Cao, serving as Acting Secretary of the Navy, offered senators a blunt before-and-after comparison. “When I was in uniform, we only produced 125 Tomahawks a year,” he said. “Right now we’re well above 60 every month.” Taken at face value, that comparison implies the Navy has moved from roughly ten missiles a month to a rate that, annualized, would exceed 700 — a jump that dwarfs typical defense-production growth curves, which usually move in increments of 10 to 20 percent a year, not multiples.

Cao’s testimony did not happen in a vacuum. Days earlier, Inside Defense reported he had credited RTX, Raytheon’s parent company, with a 300 percent increase in Tomahawk production, and said the Navy intended to begin a new multiyear procurement arrangement in fiscal year 2027. RTX itself has backed the trend line with harder numbers: the company says it delivered three times as many Tomahawks in the first half of 2026 as it did in the first half of 2025. None of these figures use identical baselines or definitions — monthly rate, annual rate, year-over-year deliveries — but they all point the same direction, and that direction is steeply upward.

The Contract Behind the Curve

The institutional engine for this growth is a seven-year, $22.9 billion contract Raytheon announced on August 17, 2026, structured to support production exceeding 1,000 Tomahawks annually. That figure is the clearest single marker of where the program is headed, even though the missiles arriving in fleets today are still ramping toward it rather than already sustaining it. The Navy’s FY2027 budget request translates the ambition into appropriations language: $3 billion for 785 missiles in a single year, nested inside a five-year plan to buy 2,996 Tomahawks through a new multiyear contract vehicle.

Multiyear procurement is not a novel tool — the Pentagon has used it for decades on aircraft and ships — but it carries a specific logic that matters here. A single-year contract gives a manufacturer no certainty beyond the next appropriations cycle, which discourages investment in tooling, supplier expansion, or workforce hiring. A multiyear deal locks in demand across several years, letting a company like Raytheon justify capital spending on propellant lines, explosive-loading capacity, and warhead-case machining that a one-year order never could. Congressional Research Service analysis of the mechanism notes it generally requires a present-value cost analysis showing savings over annual buys before Congress will authorize it, and that the war in Ukraine already drove a sharp rise in interest in exactly this kind of contracting across artillery and precision munitions.

Building the Industrial Base Behind the Numbers

Production of a weapon this complex is never a single-factory story. Raytheon is the prime contractor and systems integrator, but General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems machines the warhead cases and L3Harris loads the explosives — a division of labor that reflects decades of supplier specialization across the munitions industrial base. The Navy’s own Weapons Division is slated to begin manufacturing a warhead component starting in 2027, an unusual move toward government-organic production that suggests the service does not want its entire ramp dependent on a single commercial supply chain. Separately, Raytheon has contracted with Ursa Major and Avio USA to develop solid-rocket motors for the Tactical Tomahawk program, with a dedicated mixer facility not expected online until June 2027.

That timeline detail matters for how the production story should be read going forward. The headline figures — 60-plus a month now, 1,000-plus annually eventually — describe a trajectory, not a finished state. Parts of the supply chain that the 1,000-plus target depends on are still under construction. That is normal for an industrial ramp of this size, and it does not undercut the reported gains already achieved; it simply means the full picture will be verifiable only once those 2027 facilities come online and deliver at rate.

Why This Fits a Larger Pattern

The Tomahawk ramp is not happening in isolation. It is the latest and largest instance of a pattern that took hold across the Pentagon after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine exposed how thin American munitions stockpiles and production lines had become relative to the consumption rates of a sustained conventional conflict. Artillery shells, HIMARS rockets, and air-defense interceptors all saw similar multiyear contracting pushes, driven by the same insight now animating the Tomahawk program: peacetime annual-budget procurement cycles are poorly suited to building the kind of surge capacity a prolonged conflict demands. The 2023 defense authorization act specifically expanded multiyear procurement authority for munitions programs for this reason, and the Navy’s Tomahawk strategy is a direct descendant of that legislative shift.

The deeper context for Cao’s testimony was the strain the Iran conflict placed on Navy stockpiles and deployment schedules, a point senators pressed him on directly alongside questions about sailor welfare during extended deployments. That operational backdrop — missiles expended faster than peacetime planning assumed — is precisely the condition multiyear contracting is designed to answer. Whether the $22.9 billion commitment delivers missiles on the promised schedule, at the promised rate, will be the measure by which Congress and the fleet ultimately judge it. For now, the documented trajectory is unambiguous: production is rising sharply from a historically low baseline, and the contracting structure behind it reflects a Pentagon that has concluded inventory depth is now as strategically important as the weapons themselves.

Sources:

insidedefense.com, news.usni.org, inquirer.com, raytheon.mediaroom.com, executivegov.com, cnbc.com, purdueexponent.org